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would also require any court to deny such an order 
if the support obligation is not complied with or if 
the child is likely to become a public charge.] Resp 
did not apply to a Wisconsin court for a marriage order. 
Instead, he brought the instant suit against petr alleging 
- ----..., '--=-- -----~~~ 
that§ 245.10(1) is unconstitutional and seeking declaratory -----------and injunctive relief. He sought a plaintiff's class action 
on behalf of all similarly situated fathers whose marriage 
license applications had been turned down and a defendant's 
class action including all county clerks in Wisconsin. A 
three-judge District Court was empaneled and it declared 
~ a clas.,.§_ both of plaintiffs and defendants. It refused to 
~ orde':.., notice to~;;- un::ned class m~r,rs after stating: 
~~~ "Some courts have ruled that due process requires notice to the members of (b)(2) class if the judgment is to be binding on 
them. See, e.g., Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 
F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972); Schrader v. 
Selective Service S stern Local Board No. 76 
o Wisconsin, 7 F. d 7th Cir. , cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Eisen v.~-
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2nd 
Cir. 1968), on remand, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1971); )4 F.R.D. 565 (S.D. N.Y. 1972); 
reversed, 479 F.2d 1005 (2nd Cir. 1973); 
vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); 
Pasguier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. 
La. 1970), aff 1 d 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 
1971). Other courts have held that no notice 
need be given to the class members because 
due process is satisfied when the class is 
adequately represented by counsel. See,~-&·, 
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 
1972); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st 
Cir. 1972); Lund v. Afflect, 388 F. Supp. 137 
(D.R.I. 1975T;white v. Local No. 207 of 
Laborer's Intl. Union, 387 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. 
La. 1974); Mayer v. Weinberger, 385 F. Supp. 
1321 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Souza v. Scalone, 
, ,, . 
,I 
- 3 -
64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Calif. 1974); 
American Finance System, Inc. v. 
Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94 (D. Md. 1972); 
Watson v. Branch Cou~th Bank, 380 
F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mic . 1974); 
Llnch v. Household Finance Cor~., 
3 0 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 197 ); 
Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F. Supp. 
l 
163 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The com-
mentators have been critical of the 
line of cases requiring notice to 
(b) (2) class members. 3B Moore's 
Federal Practice IP 23.55, at 
23-1152-23-1153; 7A Wright and 
Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure,§§ 1786, 1793, at 142-144, 
203-205; Miller, 'Problems of Giving 
Notice in Class Actions.' 1973, 58 
F.R.D. 313, 313-316." 
The court rejected a request that it abstain under 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, noting that there was no pendin_fl 
state proceeding. 
The court then granted relief to resp's class on 
the merits. It held the Wisconsin statute to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause. It noted that those under suppo~t ~ 
obligations are treated differently than those not under 
. support obligations. It said that the reasons for the dif-
ferent treatment must be subjected to strict scrutiny for two 
L..... - "--' 
reasons. First, marriage is a fundamental right, Roe v. Wade, 
supra, at 152; United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 
at 486, 495; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and the discrim-
ination affects that right; and second because the classification 
~1 
~j,v~ ·. 
- 4 - "\ ,I"' -
'I 
resulted in different access to marriage by rich and 
\ \ ~,r{~y-
poor. Bulloc~ v. Harpe., 405 U.S. 134. 
2. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues (1) that abstention 
should be required under Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.; (2) that 
there cannot be class actions without notice; and (3) that 
the statute is constitutional. The state wants to make sure 
that resp's money, if and when he gets any, be used first to 
support his already existing child and not to support a new 
wife and children by her. 
3. DISCUSSION: The Huffman argument seems meritless 
to me. There is no pending state proceeding. The class 
action point is not very important in this case where due to 
§ 1253 a binding precedent in this Court will in any event 
result. It will be of more importance in other non-3-Judge 
Court cases, however, and I think it should be resolved --
especially if the Court is to give plenary consideration to 
the merits. 
On the merits, this case seems to me to present a 
substantive due process issue rather than an e__guaL protec~ion 
~ue. Resp's position is not really made any better by 
reason of the fact that there are other people -- those not 
under a support obligation -- who can marry without court order. 
His claim is simply that the State cannot prohibit him from 
marrying just because he has a child which he can't support. 
The wealth classification point ~ade by the court below escapes 
me. 
- 5 -
It seems to me that the result reached by the 
court below is probably correct. However, this Court 
should probably not create new substantive due process 
rights by summary affirmance. I w~uld note the case. 
2/2/77 
ME 
There is a motion to affirm. 
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No. 76-879, Zablocki, Milwaukee County Clerk v. Redhail 
MEMO TO FILE 
This is dictated after reviewing the briefs in the above 
case. It is merely an "aid to memory" rather than an analysis. 
Any view expressed or implied is quite tentative. 
* * * * * 
This is an appeal from a three-judge district court in 
Wisconsin that, in a§ 1983 action, invalidated Wisconsin statute 
§ 245.10. That statute requires formal court permission before 
certain Wisconsin residents are allowed to marry. The plaintiff 
in this case (appellee here) was the admitted father of an il-
legitimate child. He had been ordered to pay $109 per month as 
support for the child, but due to his indigency had paid nothing 
with an accumulated obligation of some $3,700. His child was a 
public charge, living on welfare benefits. The defendant (appellant) 
was county clerk of Milwaukee County, who denied appellee's applica-
tion for a marriage license because he had not obtained court authority 
under§ 245.10 to marry. 
No. 76-879 2 • 
That statute applies to persons who have minor issue not 
in their custody whom they have been ordered to support. It provides 
that permission to marry shall be withheld unless the parent submits 
proof that he or she has complied with the support order and the 
child is not likely to become a public charge. 
As there was no way appellee could submit such proof, he 
was barred by the statute from marrying -- whether the marriage took 
place in Wisconsin or in some other state. Appellee, therefore, did 
not petition the state court for permission to marry, and filed this 
action in federal court. 
A Rule 23(a) (2) class was certified for_both plaintiff and 
defendant. The defendant class was defined as "all county clerks 
of counties within the state of Wisconsin." There were 72 such 
county clerks, whose identity and addresses were known. But no 
notice was given them. The Attorney General of the state, however, 
represented the defendant Zablocki. 
Three issues were presented to the three-judge court, wit~ ; 
each being decided in favor of appellee. These issues are now 
presented on this appeal: 
1. Abstention. In view of appellee's failure to exhaust 
state remedies (i.e., seek relief in the state courts), it is argued 
that under Younger v. Harris and particularly under Huffman v. Pursue, 
420 U.S. 592, the federal courts should have abstained. My tentative 
view is that abstention was not required here. No state court pro-------------- - - --
ceeding was pending. See Wooley v. Maynard ("Live Free or Die"), --~ 
decided April 20, 1977. Nor was there any doubt or ambiguity as to 
No. 76-879 3. 
the requirements of the Wisconsin statute, or as to the inability 
of appellee to comply with its terms. Moreover, this was a civil 
matter, and we have not yet extended Younger to a purely civil 
action. 
2. Failure to Give Notice. Appellants argue that under 
Eisen (417 U.S. 156), failure to give notice violated Rule 23 and 
also denied due process. My recollection of Eisen is that it applied 
to Rule 23(b) (3) action, and did not address the notice requirements 
in (b) (2) cases. Notice should have been given, but the class was 
represented by the Attorney General of Wisconsin, and the final order 
required that a copy of it be sent to all of the class members. In 
these circumstances, I think the district court was probably right. 
3. Validity of the Statute. The three-judge court in-
validated the statute on both equal protection and substantive due 
process grounds. The statute established a classification of persons 
who were required to obtain prior court authorization of marriage. 
The district court, in a somewhat opaque analysis, found marriage 
to be a fundamental right under the Constitution, one derived from ,, 
the "right of privacy" which -- in turn -- the court seemed to think 
was a right of "liberty." It held that strict scrutiny was required, 
but that the Wisconsin statute did not even meet the rational basis 
test. 
I am inclined, tentatively, to agree with the results. 
The right to marry, subject to certain types of state regulations 
(e.g., age restrictions), is certainly "fundamental," from whatever 
No. 76-879 4. 
source the right may said to be derived. I view it as a "liberty" 
right, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Relevant 
cases are abundently cited in appellee's brief. 
Although the compelling state interest test may well be 
applicablf' I think I could probably agree with the district court 
that this statute fails to meet the rational basis test. It is by 
no means clear that prohibiting marriage would be likely to cause 
a defaulting father to support a child, or that denial of the right 
to marriage would prevent him from fathering other children who would 
become burdens upon the state. Moreover, other state statutes 
exist (or could exist) far more likely to achieve the desired result 
if the state chooses to enforce them. As noted in the three-judge 
court's opinion (jurisdictional statement, Al6) there are several 
existing statutes under which obligations to support may be imposed 
and enforced. 
~ fh,.___~~kr; j ~~ 
/--0~ u~~-
2. 
law issue here, let alone one which would render unnecessary a 
constitutional decision. The statute is clear on its face and 
appellant does not even suggest any material ambiguity 
requiring resolution by the state courts. Appellant's 
reliance on Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) is therefore 
misplaced. In Reetz, the Court vacated a three judge court's 
determination of invalidity based on state, as well as 
federal, constitutional grounds because the district court 
"should have stayed its hand while the parties repaired to the 
state courts for a resolution of their state constitutional 
2 
questions." 397 U.S. at 87. 
The unelaborated suggestion that a state court might 
find a state law ground for invalidating a statute unambiguous 
on its face provides no basis for abstention. The Court has 
repeatedly refused to require abstention simply because 
invalidation under the state constitution is a theoretical 
possibility. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 
77 (1975); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 
597-98 (1976) . 
The somewhat distinct, comity-based abstention 
doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and Huffman 
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), is inapplicable because 
of the absence of a pending state civil proceeding. It is 
"[t]he pendency of the state court action [which] call[s] for 
restraint by the federal court and for dismissal of [the] 
, ,. . 
complaint, absent "extraordinary circumstances warranting 
federal interference" or inadequate state procedures for 
litigating the federal claim. Trainor v. Hernandez, No. 
75-1407 (decided May 3, 1977), slip op. 12. As in Wooley v. 
Maynard, No. 75-1453 (decided April 20, 1977), slip op. 5, 
"the suit is no way 'designed to annul the results of a state 
trial' since the relief sought is wholly prospective," to 
preclude enforcement of §245.10. 
3. 
That appellee sought to obtain a marriage license 
from the county clerk does not give rise to a "pending 
proceeding" for Younger-Huffman purposes. Unlike the 
situation in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396-397 n. 3 (1975), 
appellee did not "first obtain [] an adjudication of [his] 
claim on the merits in the [Wis.] state court and only then 
commence[] this action" in federal court. Considerations of 
comity and federalism governing federal interference with 
state judicial processes which have been set in motion, 
Trainor, slip op. 7, are inapposite here. Appellant is really 
asking the Court to transform the Younger doctrine into a 
general requirement of exhaustion of state judicial 
3 
remedies. Exhaustion may play a limited role in 
foreclosing subsequent litigation in federal court of claims 
which could have been raised in the ongoing state proceeding, 
Judice v. Vail, No. 75-1397 (decided March 22, 1977), slip op. 
9, but here no state judicial proceeding preceded the instant 
§1983 action. 
- - "'--~ '· 
, , . 
B. Notice to Defendant Class In a Rule 23(b) (2) Class 
Action 4/ 
4. 
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 & 
n.14 (1974), the Court held that Rule 23(c) (2) "requires that 
individual notice be sent to all class members who can be 
identified 'with reasonable effort.'" However, the Court was 
careful to note that its decision concerned only "the notice 
requirements of subdivision (c) (2), which are applicable to 
class actions maintained under subdivision (b) (3). By its 
terms subdivision (c) (2) is inapplicable to class actions for 
injunctive or declaratory relief maintained under subdivision 
(b) (2)." See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 397 n. 4 ("the 
problems associated with a Rule 23(b) (3) class action," see 
Eisen, "are not present" in a Rule 23 (b) ( 2) action) . 
Relying on Eisen's footnote 14, the three judge court 
held that the applicable notice provision is Rule 23(d) (2), 
and the question becomes one of due process. The court noted 
that "[a]n ironclad rule requiring individual notice to 
members of a (b) (2) class action would frustrate use of (b) (2) 
class actions," and would serve no useful purpose as members 
of a (b) (2) class cannot "opt out" (Juris. St. App. 8). The 
court held that the discretionary notice provisions of Rule 
23(d) (2) are facially consonant with due process. It reasoned 
that due process requires only that "interested parties" be 
given notice, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 389 
U.S. 306, 
5. 
314 (1950). Here, the members of the defendant class were not 
interested persons in any realistic sense, for "it is the 
state's interest, not that of the county clerks, that is in 
reality involved. The state's interest was protected by the 
state attorney general who represented the named defendant and 
would also be representing the other members of the defendant 
class whether orr not notice was given." (Juris. St., App. 
21). Furthermore, the three judge court found no "special 
circumstances" requiring individual notice in this case. 
Dicta contained in J. Medina's ruling for CA2 in 
Eisen II, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (1968) spawned a handful of 
decisions holding that "notice is required as a matter of due 
5 
process in all representative actions." That position is 
rapidly becoming the minority view, especially after footnote 
6 
14. 
The leading commentaries argue against a notice 
7 
requirement for (b) (2) actions. In their view, due 
process considerations are satisfied by the presumed adequacy 
of representation, and the virtual identity of claims and 
defenses in an otherwise maintainable (b) (2) action. The 
rulemakers saw the (b) (2) action as a vehicle for civil rights 
claims "where a party is charged with discriminating 
unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members are 
incapable of specific enumeration." A requirement of 
individual notice in such actions would defeat the purpose of 
the rule • 
. 
\ 
Furthermore, in many situations a requirement of notice is 
senseless, for members of a (b) (2) class have no opportinity 
to "opt out." 
6. 
Mullane, of course, is the sticking point. The Court 
held that publication notice was insufficient to accord an in 
personam effect to a state court accounting as to absent, 
known common trust fund beneficiaries. While the language 
enjoys J. Jackson's characteristic breadth and persuasiveness, 
the Court was really concerned about the adequacy of 
representation and of the prospect of prejudice to the 
interests of absent beneficiaries. The Court noted: 
[T]hese beneficiaries do have a resident fiduciary as 
caretaker of their interests in this property. But 
it is their caretaker who in the accounting becomes 
their adversary. Their trustee is released from 
giving notice of jeopardy, and no one else is 
expected to do so. 
339 U.S. at 316. 
The (b) ( 2) class act ion presents a very different 
setting, and here adequacy of representation, on both 
plaintiff and defendant sides, may satisfy the command of due 
process. "[T]his Court is justified in saying that there has 
been a failure of due process only in those cases where it 
cannot be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insure the 
protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be 
bound by it." Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42, also 43 
(1940). 
There may be situations where "fundamental fairness" 
requires notice in (b) (2) class actions, e.g., where there may 
; 
be differences among the members of the plaintiff class with 
respect to the details of a structural injunctive decree. The 
court's discretion to provide notice under Rule 23(d) (2), 
coupled with appellate review for abuse of discretion, should 
prevent an unconstitutional application of the Rule. See 
Developments-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1391-1453 
(1976). As the court below found, no "special circumstances" 
warranting pre-judgment notice were present in this case. 
III. THE MERITS 
A. Equal Protection 
1. "Strict Scrutiny". The three judge court held 
that "strict scrutiny" was appropriate because §245.10 affects 
the "fundamental right" to marry and employs a wealth 
classification. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
If strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of 
review, there can be little dispute that the statute is 
fatally overbroad with respect to the asserted state interests 
of counseling and safeguarding the welfare of indigent 
children. The denial of the right to marry to an indivdual 
who has satisfied all support obligations simply because his 
issue remains or is likely to become a public charge cannot be 
rationally justified on any theory, and appellant does not 
even proffer an argument to support this feature of the 
statutory scheme. Appellant asserts that the requirement that 
residents meet their support obligations before they take on 
the additional responsibilities of a spouse and new issue 
furthers legitimate state interests in providing (1) an 
' . 
8. 
opportunity for mandatory counseling, and (2) an incentive to 
satisfy existing support obligations. The goals are ( 
legitimate, but the means employed in§ 245.10 are ~verbroad, 
unnecessary, and unsuited to the stated purposes. 
Counseling does not take place during the §245.10 
hearing, although the experience itself may have a sobering 
effect on the willingness to incur further obligations in a 
new marriage. The safeguarding of the interests of the prior 
issue can be furthered by more d~ ct means: ascontempt 
proceedings "L mprisonment or conditional probatio~ age _, ~ 
attachment, etc. It can also be argued that even if a legal 
marriage is blocked, cohabitation and childbirth out of tf)f ~ 
wedlock will continue unabated. Moreover, marriage may 
improve the financial position of an individual, enabling him 
to better meet his pre-existing obligations. 
Appellant argues that "strict strutiny" is 
inappropriate given the Court's recognition in Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975), that domestic relations is "an area 
that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province 
of the states." This case involves not "the right to marry in 
the abstract," but "the right to marry where the applicant has 
minor children to support." And this is not a statute which 
is aimed at the poor per se. In appellant's view, §245.10 
must be viewed as consonant with traditional state marriage 
regulations, such as requirements relating to age, blood 
tests, competency, solemnization, and fees, and restrictions 
relating to incest and bigamy. A requirement of a "compelling 
state purpose" would undermine traditional state regulation of 
the marriage regulations. (Br. 12-16) . 
I ' 
9. 
The freedom to marry is a fundamental right implicit 
in the Constitution. See,~-~·, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); 
and the several due process - personal autonomy 
9 
decisions. I think the decisions would support 
application of a compelling state purpose test to legislation 
abridging that right (although this also could be accomplished 
by substantive due process analysis). See Maher v. Roe, No. 
75-1440 (decided June 20, 1977), slip op. 6-7 (legislation 
interfering with a "fundamental right" implicit in due process 
of law triggers "strict scrutiny" under the equal protection 
clause) • 
I do not think Sosna is really to the contrary. The 
Court viewed the durational residency requirement for divorce 
as unduly delaying, not "irretrievably foreclos[ing] ," access 
to the courts to perfect a divorce. 419 U.S. at 406. 
Although it did not articulate a standard of review, the Court 
found "the state interest in requiring that those who seek a 
divorce from its courts be genuinely attached to the state, as 
well as a desire to insulate divorce decrees from the 
likelihood of collateral attack," sufficiently weighty to 
warrant "a different resolution of the constitutional issue 
than was the case in Shapiro .. " Id., at 409. See 
generally The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 47, 
91-92 (1975). 
The three judge court's recognition of the "wealth 
.,. 
classification" componen~ additional reason for "strict 
scrutiny" seems debatable. The strongest case would be an 
individual who has met his support obligation but has a child 
who is or is likely to become a public charge. In such a 
situation, the statute "operates to the peculiar disadvantage 
of [a] class fairly defined as indigent," and "lack of 
personal resources [will have] occasioned an absolute 
deprivation of the desired benefit." San Antonio School Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22, 23 (1973). There is some 
question in my mind whether appellee who did not meet his 
support obligations, has standing to attack this feature of 
the statutory scheme. The aspect of the statute as to which 
appellee clearly has standing does not necessarily "operate to 
the peculiar disadvantage of [a] class fairly defined as 
indigent." Not all support obligation scofflaws are 
indigent. And it would seem that if a person is truly 
i~dig,;:..nt, in most states he can seek a modification of the 
prior custody or divorce decree on grounds of "changed 
circumstances". 
2. Intermediate Scrutiny. If an equal protection 
L ·~ .. ~ 0 &:_ 1.i, ,;,~~~~ roach is used in this case, I would recommend an ~ ~ 1 
~~- intermediate level of scrutiny, that the statute "must serve .JU«-C-, 
1)/"'Y- . ..,,,,t-,' important governmental objectives and must be substantial!~ 
~~- ~-;..A/0 related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, ~ 
~ 97 S.Ct. 451, 457 (1976). This standard has been used in sex~ · 
and illegitimacy cases, i.e., suspect, non-racial 
classifications. I see no reason why it cannot be extended to 
the "fundamental right" branch of equal protection. Marriage, 
11. 
and domestic relations generally, would seem to be an 
appropriate area. Although the right to marry enjoys 
constitutional protection, it is a liberty interest which 
traditionally has been subject to extensive state regulation. 
It is possible to read Sosna as an intermediate scrutiny case, 
notwithstanding the state's interference with the "fundamental 
right" to dissolve a bad marriage, Boddie v. Connecticut. 
The argument can be made that "strict scrutiny" poses 
no significant risk of interference with traditional 
requirements for a marriage license,~' blood tests, 
competency, solemnization, etc. The incest, homosexuality, and 
bigamy restrictions would face some difficulties under a 
"compelling state purpose" test, although this problem could 
be eliminated by defining the "fundamental right" as 
coextensive with traditional pairing. Cf. Village of Belle 
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Age barriers could be 
premised on the presumed lack of capacity of minors. Cf. 
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629(1968); but see Carey v. 
Population Services Int'l, No. 75-443 (decided June 9, 1977). 
However, without cataloging every possible state law 
requirement in this area, it is fair to say there is a risk a 
./~,L. 
that legitimate state concerns might be frustrated under a 
"compelling state purpose" regime. I am not entirely certain 
that the marriage context warrants intense judicial 
examination of every burden on the right to marry. And I think 
an undesirable development to dilute further the ' ........... __ ..uz,,,,..,. s.w:a~ 
(
it would be 
yt' concept of "compelling state interest," as has been done in 
the voting rights and ballot access cases, see, e.g., Storer 
12. 
v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Amer. Party of Texas v. White, 
415 U.S. 767 (1974), in order to uphold traditional, 
legitimate state restrictions in the domestic relations sphere. 
An intermediate standard would result in the 
invalidation of §145.10. However, because of focus on the 
substantiality, rather than the compelling nature, of the 
state's justification and on the means-end fit, application of 
this standard is less likely to result in undue interference 
with legitimate state regulatory concerns. 
3. "Rational Basis." Clearly, a part of the statute 
is without any rationality. To condition the right to marry -----===----~-...,...-=...,...,. 
on having previous issue who are not now and not likely to 
become public charges, is to punish people for being poor. But 
if that is the only basis of invalidity, there is a question 
-'/ whether appellee has standing . Even if the Court strikes down 
this feature, assuming it is severable from the rest of the 
statute, appellee still cannot marry in Wisconsin. Of course, 
( 
this is a class action, but there are no named plaintiffs who 
are truly aggrieved by this particular feature of the 
10 ~ ~ 
scheme. ' 
I am not certain that the support payment requirement 
would fail a rational basis test. The test is a fairly --------------------
lenient one. Wisconsin wants to encourage support payments, 
and in furtherance of that goal the state refuses to permit 
scofflaws to marry and thus incur new financial obligations. 
Undoubtedly, this is a heavy-handed, unnecessary approach. But 
"rational basis" scrutiny does not require the state to chose 
"the best means to accomplish this purpose." Massachusetts 
13. 
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976). 
B. Substantive Due Process 
Perhaps a better ground would be substantive due 
process. Appellee suggests that Wisconsin's statute is unique 
among the states. A statute which approaches an absolute 
denial of the fundamental right to marry intrudes into a 
traditional sphere of personal autonomy. "While the outer 
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the 
Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual 
may make without unjustified government interference are 
personal decisions 'relating to marriage, [etc.]'" Carey, slip 
op. 5 (emphasis supplied). 
The right to marry "may not lightly be denied by 
the state." [W]hen the government intrudes on choices 
concerning family living arrangements, the Court must examine 
carefully the importance of the governmental interests 
advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
challenged regulation. Moore v. East Cleveland, No. 75-6289 
(decided May 31, 1977), slip op. 5, 11. 
Moore, of course, is a plurality decision. However, 
J. Stevens concurred in the judgment for reasons which would 
be applicable here. As in Moore, "[t]here appears to be no 
precedent" for the Wisconsin statute, and §145.10 "has not 
been shown to have any 'substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare'" of the state. 
Moore, op. 7-8. 
The advantage of the Moore approach is that the 
standard of review is rigorous, but not as rigid as 
"compelling state purpose" scrutiny, and the occasions for 
judicial interference are limited by the teachings of history 
and deeply rooted tradition. Moore, slip op. 8-9. 
Of course, Moore is distinguishable. Aside from the 
zoning regulation in that case, the states do not generally 
intrude upon family living arrangements. By contrast, 
regulation of marriage is routine, traditional business of the 
states. On the other hand, the Court has been willing to 
override the exercise of state regulatory power in the 
interest of safeguarding the due process right of privacy or 
right of personal autonomy. See, e.g., Carey (invalidating 
restrictions on the retail distribution of nonmedical 
contraceptives and on the distribution of such to those under 
sixteen years of age}. 
Some further support for a due process approach can 
be found in J. Harlan's decision in Boddie. In that case, the 
Court struck down filing fees for divorce actions as applied 
to those unable to pay. The Court held "that a State may not 
consistent with the obligations imposed on it by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, preempt the right 
to dissolve this legal relationship without affording all 
citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing so." 
Monopolization is present here. Indeed, Wisconsin's 
preemption is even more pervasive, for the state will not 
recognize foreign marriages. 
Boddie was an "as applied" challenge. The decision 
would support a requirement that Wisconsin permit individuals 
in appellee's circumstances to marry if they can demonstrate 
"the bona fides of [their] indigency," 401 U.S., at 382. By 
its terms, Boddie does not require invalidation of§ 145.10 as 
unconstitutional on its face, unless the Court is willing to 
assume that bona fide indigents comprise the overwhelming 
number of support obligation scofflaws. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, I recommend affirmance, either because of a 
failure to satisfy intermediate equal protection scrutiny or 




1. Appellee counters that this abstention theory was 
not raised in the district court, where appellant's abstention 
argument was based solely on the Younger-Huffman doctrine. In 
Hostetler v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964), 
the Court declined to require Pullman absention where there 
was "no danger a federal decision would work a disruption of 
an entire legislative scheme of regulation," and "where 
neither party requested it and where the litigation has 
already been long delayed .... " 
2. Appellant also refers to Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 
319 U.S. 312 (1943), which involved a suit based on diversity 
jurisdiction and the due process clause to enjoin a state 
railroad commission order permitting the drilling of oil wells 
in a certain oil field separated by distances less than the 
minimum prescribed for the field in general. The Court found 
that the underlying dispute presented questions of state 
policy which were the province of the state administrative 
body, and that the due process contention was 
indistinguishable from the state law requirement of 
reasonableness. Id., at 332-33. 
3. Unlike the Younger-Huffman cases, appellee is not 
seeking to enjoin a state statute pursuant to which he had 
been haled into a state proceeding as a defendant. 
N-2 
4. There is some question whether this contention 
was properly presented below. The three judge court noted 
that although the district court's pretrial order invited 
appellant and the Wisconsin attorney general to submit any 
written objections to the maintainability of a class action, 
appellant failed to make any submission (Juris. St., App. 5). 
Appellee noted that counsel for appellant waited six months to 
voice their notice contention during the oral argument before 
the three judge court on the merits. (Br. 47 n. 24). On the 
other hand, the three judge court passed on the class action 
issue. 
Appellee also argues that the named defendant, 
appellant here, has no standing to contest the lack of notice 
given to other members of the defendant class. This contention 
is not frivolous. Lack of notice may prevent the operation of 
res judicata as to the unnamed members of the defendant class, 
but it is not a ground for overturning the three judge court 
decision as to appellant. On the other hand, appellant is the 
representative of the defendant class and is obligated to 
assert the interests of the class as a whole. Appellant might 
argue that he had standing to challenge the maintainability of 
the class action during the pre-trial period, and to assert 
the need for pre-judgment notice below, and his standing 
continues in this Court. But see note 10 infra. 
5. See,~-~-, Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (CA6 
1972); Schrader v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 76 
\ 
or w1scons1n, 470 F.2d 73 (CA7), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1085 
(1972). 
6. Even CA2 has reconsidered its position. Ives v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749 (1975). Accord, Yaffe v. Powers, 
454 F.2d 1362, 1366 (CAl 1972); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 508 F.2d 239 (CA3), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); 
Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053, 1055 (CA4 1972); cf. Bijeol 
v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n. 3 (CA7 1975) (earlier Schrader 
ruling will have to be reexamined). 
7. 3B Moore's Federal Practice Par. 23.55, at 
23-1152 - 23-1153; 7A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, §§ 1786, 1973, at 142-44, 203-05; Miller, Problems 
of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-16 
(1973). 
8. Committee's Notes to Revised Rule 23, 3B Moore's 
Federal Practice Par. 23.01 [10.-2), at 23-28. 
9. The Court has yet to hold that "strict scrutiny" 
is triggered simply because legislation impacts the "right to 
marry," standing alone. The alternative grounds in Loving, for 
example, turned on the presence of a racial classification. 
Boddie, which will be discussed below, involved a wealth 
classification as well as the right to divorce. 
10. Cf. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969); Bailey v. 
Patterson, 396 U.S. 31 (1962). See generally 
Developments-Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1463-71 
(1976). 
I am not entirely certain as to how to resolve the 
standing question. The doctrine of jus tertii may support 
., 
appellee's standing to challenge the statute as a whole. See 
Craig v. Boren, 97 S.Ct. at 455-56. Moreover, in equal 
protection cases, the Court has shown a willingness to 
entertain challenges premised in part on overbreadth analysis. 
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 
(1969). But cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
I would also note that on the same day the three 
judge court decided Zablocki, it dismissed a companion case, 
involving a challenge by a father of a public charge who had 
V{ 
made all suport payments. The court noted: "Because 
" plaintiffs in this action fit the above description and are 
entitled to relief as members of the plain~iff's class in 
Redhail, the individual action is hereby dismissed as moot." 
Leipzig v. Pallamolla, 418 F.Supp. 1061(1976); see ACLU amicus 
br. 
In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), 
the Court refused to dismiss a Title VII action based on 
discrimination in hiring and seeking retroactive seniority, 
even though the only named representative of the plaintiff 
class had been hired by the employer and later properly 
discharged for cause. The Court noted that "[t]he unnamed 
members of the class involved identifiable individuals, 
individually named in the record," some of whom had "already 
availed themselves of the hiring relief ordered by the 
District Court," and that "[n]o questions are raised 
concerning the continuing desire of any of these class members 
; 
for the seniority relief presently in issue." Id. at 756. 
Perhaps, Leipzig, the "identifiable" plaintiff in the 
companion case, removes any standing problem presented by the 
absence of a perfect fit between appellee's grievance and the 
grounds of invalidity asserted. 
S.E. 
J ; 
Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From:. Sam Estreicher 
Date: September 24, 1977 
Re: Zablocki v. Redhail, No. 76 - 879--Supplement to 
Bench Memo 
In writing the memo for this case, I discussed 
middle-tier review without adverting to your concurring 
opinion in Craig v. Boren. This was an ,oversigh~. 
I recognize the problems with "a further sub-
dividing of equal protection analysis," 96 S.Ct. at 
464fn, but the Court has fairly consistently declined 
to give any substance to the "rational basis"test. To my 
knowledge, there has been only one modern "rational 
bas i s"decision resulting in a holding against the 
legislative classification which did not involve a 
"fundamental right" or "suspect class." That was 
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), which, I believe, 
was overruled last term (I cannot remember the name of the 
case). 
Of course, the language in Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), is adequate to the task 
in this case. Wisconsin would be hard pressed to show 
that its classification is "reasonable, not arbitrary, 
and ... rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation, so that all persons similarly c ircu~stanced 
shall be treated alike." 
The Royster test was used in Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71, 76 (1971), to strike down an arbitrary gender-
-2-
based classification, but, as you recognized in Craig, 
"the relatively deferential 'rational basis' standard 
of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus 
when we address a gender-based classification," 97 S.Ct. 
at 464fn, even though the Court has yet to hold gender 
a 11 suspect class." 
By "middle tier review," I meant to suggest that 
the rigidities of "compelling state purpose" analysis 
might be avoided by applying r ational basis "with a 
sharper focus 11 --"with teeth," in Gunther's terms-- to 
a classification impinging the "fundamental" decision 
whether or not to marry. 
S. E. 
se/lab 9/27 /T' 
~ ~k,,,,~)-~ ih 
·'Y/ ht;£ ~ ~ tJ VUJ ' ~ . .t,d-~ 
ty:_r ~ ~ c:;,;_'i,-, ~~ ~ /-J ? . 
To: Mr. Jus{ i c~~~o~ei1,,I"- Date: September 27, 1977 
of llf ~ I ~A- - I-CL. . -~ - I - I 
From: /Sam Estreicn~~,~ ~~LX.I.....) ~
~::!}~:+~w 
RE: 76-879 Zablocki v. Redliail - Appellees/"Suppl. Memo 
~~-4 
~ ;d-App e 11 e es submit a supplemental memorandum ~ 
ct:4'_,.d_, __ ,;1- ~ · . 
suggest i ng that the Court should postpone argument becat"~~ he u...,, ~. 
Wisconsin state assembly has passed a bill which includes a 
revision of§ 245.10, the statute in dispute here. Appellees 
state that as soon as the assembly decides a procedural motion, 
final approval will come and the Governor is expected to sign 
the legislation on September 29, 1976. 
The major changes from§ 245.10 are: 
1. The bill does not require support-obligated 
parents of out-of-wedlock children to get permission to marry. 
2. It does not require proof that the child is not 
and is not likely to become a public charge. 
3. It gives the court authority to grant permission 
to marry to a person who has not complied with the prior 
support order if clear and confincing proof is submitted that 
the person is unable to comply. 
4. It establishes a "rebuttable statutory 
presumption that a remarriage by any parent who is obligated by 
court order or judgment to provide support for any child 
.. _ in his or her custody may substantially affect that chi l d's 
\ 
right of support. Such presumptionmay be overcome by 
II sufficient contrary proof submitted to the court. 
2. 
While the proposed legislation may eliminate some of 
the more problematic features of the Wisconsin statute, the 
instant dispute would not be mooted even if the measure is - :..w,a ,,-, -- -ultimately signed into law. First, the new§ 245.10 does not 
become effective until the procedures under the old statute are 
stayed or enjoined by order of any court. (This is the first 
time I have even heard of a statute that remains "in reserve" 
until a court enjoins its predecessor.) Second, the statute 
would still require individuals who seek to remarry to show 
that they have satisfied prior support obligations or are 
unable to comply. The statute still impinges the right to 
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Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: October 28, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879--Zablocki v. Redhail//TM's draft 
I have not critiqued the actual language or closely 
examined some of the citations because I want to find 
out whether we are going to write separately in this 
case. 
TM uses a standard "fundamental right"/"s t rict scrutiny" 
approach, premising the holding on the imprecision of the 
means-end fit. Within this framework, the analysis is 
proper. My one major problem is the first complete paragraph 
on p. 12, where TM draws a distinction, which eludes me, 
between "reasonable regulations that do not significantly 
interfere with the decision to enter into the mar·tal 
relationship," and the statuto ry classification at issue 
here which "does interfere directly and substantially with 
the right to marry ." Rules proscribing incest or requiring1 
blood tests are constitutional because they are justifiable')~/ 
not because of the degree of direct interference with · , 
the decision whether or not to marry. 
In my view, a "strict scrutiny" approach is in tension) 
with the network of restrictions that the states have ~ ~ 
fashioned to govern marriage and divorce. 
The question is whether you wish to write separately, 
even 
to the effect that/unde r intermediate level or "rational 
basis" scrutiny, the Wisconsin scheme must fall. Tom 
Campbell of BRW' s chambers has in_d.icate9 to me that ~RW 
may write separately along these lines. 
If you do decide to join, I would like an opportunity to 
make 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§ltpTtmt <!}curl cf tfyt ~ttiuh ~g 
~ag!fin.gfott, J. <!}. 2.llp)!,,;l 
October 31, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am glad to join your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
j1t1l 
Mr. Justice Marshall _ 
cc: The Conference 
,,.. 
r. 
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l ,. 
~1qrrtmt <.qanrt of t~t Pnittll ~fair.a 
1U'a1'1p:ttgfon, ~. <.q. 2Ilp 't.;1 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTI C E WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
October 31, 1977 
RE: No. 76-879 Zablocki v. Redhail, etc. 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
' 
- ,. . 
" .. 





.:%>u:vumt (!tcurt cf flrt ~th ;%,mttg 
JJi:tGqinghm. ~. (!t. 2llffeJ.!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
November 3, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I shall await the dissent in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
§>nµrmtt ~llltrl nf tfy.r i1mtdl .;§tatts 
~aslftngtcn, ~- <4. 20 .;iJ!-' 
November 3, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood, 
I plan to write separately in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 





.:§n:prtm.t <!f!lttrl trf tfrt ~th- .:§t~il 
jirctS!rittgfott, ~. <!f. 2.crgr~, 
CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 3, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am sorry to have delayed in preparation of my dissent 





Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
; ,. . 
,· 
' . , se/ss 11/15/77 
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76-879, ZABLOCKI V. RE&HAIL 
.l..1'0 =J 3 
·-- ~ ~-
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Alone among the states, Wisconsin denies a 
resident having minor issue not in his custody permission 
to marry unless he submitSproof of compliance with 
outstanding child support obligation;.,.._~ ~ n 
I..,_ MC.M,4.,t ~ ~ : 
demonstrat~ that such children "are not then 
/\ 
addition,• 
and are not 
likely thereaftfr to become public charges." Wis. Stat. 
'--....w\.,e·H,.-r t'1c. """'"t'Yl"',..,I". ,, S•\t'""'"'Jc.dl w,ht,11 ,o,.. w,4r...-o ... t-
~+-h~ s+~f-c. 
§§245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973). The prohibiton is absoluteJ 
8@l!W! ~ recognize common law 
marriage license lawfully may be issued in Wisconsin to a ,. 
resident who is a noncustodial parent except upon court 
order pursuant to the statute. Any marriage entered into 
by such a resident, whether solemnized within or without ) 
the state's borders, that does not conform 
requirements of§ 245.10 is declared void ~--· .~,;,.,. ~ a.cq,i1i5~Rg ~arriage licenses in violation of §245.10 are , 
the judgment of the Court that ~A~ ~9~~/1 
restrictions on t .he exclusive means15~;tbe r as : 
~::;:Ir en<! w! ~ ect~e i..,.~~ :.:_...10:(.1.~ H), _y · cannot ) 
~ applicable constitutional standards. I write ; 
sn~r. 
l 
separately because i iear ~~~t the majority's rationale 
sweeps too broadly in an area which traditionally has been 
s~bject to pleftafy state regulation. 
( ~ 
- ----yz-
my view, the \ 
• 
• Cle -'I .., 4.,. -, 
~mal!t!l ~:m w.e concepts of "fundamental 
~- ''t.t-,,-,".-1 ,~ i1 ~111i111+t-011'' 
arid !'s0HlpelliA'3 stat.e iAt~ ,is ne · er mandated by the 
/ ,., .. ·,I; 
. . . ~ .dt'tf~4. ·7. . 
Const1 tu t1on nor necessary to.A'ii v e.l 1sate ti.IQ rQ.: t, 1 e4HOA@ 
ie!"' this case ~ 
. .. ~~ 
The Court apparently would subject all state 
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes 
with the decision to marry in a traditional family setting 
to "critical examination" or "compelling state interest" 
analysis. Presumably, "reasonable regulations that do not 
2 . 
significantly interfere with the decision to enter into the 
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." Slip. 
"fk Cow-t d11~J nci/'Jrt~ h.t>We\Jt(; ~ ,ll)f'i'I\C1flGL n,.e,,¢.hc,J.. ;!)F ~,:S-fmc;'vi.rla;wtq 
op. 12. ,10 6.ir.e\iriRat, eaeie is o:l§f@Eild-,-he~mver-,- 'l§o.i-- v J 
' 1~0 • ., ~ -!c! 
eiat:i-r1gaishi11g between classificationrR "iAeer£er@:... · 
d~rect:ly iiRd sJJbStil.R\iially wiieh U1e 1dghe ee marry" and 
otber re&6~ictioAs whicb-do- not-have""""t hTS -e'f"feet"'. Since 
state regulation in this area typically takes the form of a 
prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, f aa~~t 
{ ~ '/ dtl""t.dt1ess •' erf- r1t_/ 
~~ i:£ie :~;,y;i rii-=ree'e'" interference 
t A) I tv11?g ~_/ 
marry or~ divorce ;r1~ &t provide• 
with the decision to 
{e,·-fkr _s vi'~ ~ _/ 




On several occasions, the Court has recognized the 
importance of the marriage relationship to the structure of 
values essential to organized society. "This Court has 
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters 
of marriage and family life is one of the liberties 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 . 
U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). Our decisions make clear that the 
guarantee of personal privacy or autonomy secured against 
I 
unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due Process 
Clause "has some extension to activities relating to 
marriage, Loving v. Virginia , 399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ... 
,, 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). While the outer 
limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by 
this Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an 
individual may make without unjustified government 
interference are personal decisions relating to marriage. 
" Carey v. Population Services International, __ _ 
U.S. No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, Slip op. 5. --, 
JA1 i t b~m t r? t tQWp t-i, P,S. it "88 ;f.i FloioJ. i V@ MB~ i l. la. 'e io11 0 f 
(tail+d, 
t h.e 1 TQ.f aa.i.J;;i, ~ -e>E ""' .- pd E it." y a qJ.o n om y 
/ qr ~I 






is a right of marital and familial privacy which places 
_j} 
substantive limits on the regulatory power of government, 
~ 
~ the Court has yet to hold that the presumption of 
constitutionality which attaches generally to legislation 
disappears simply because the government seeks to regulate 
the conditions of entry into or the dissolution of the 
marriage relationship. 
The principal authority cited by the majority is 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Although Loving 
speaks of the "freedom to marry" as "one of the vital 
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men," the Court's focus was explicitly on 
the miscegnation statute before it. Chief Justice Warren 
stated: 
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of 
man', fundamental to our very existence and 
survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942). See also Maynard v. Oklahoma, 125 U.S. 
190 (1888). To deny this fundamental freedom on 
so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, 
classifications so directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all of 
the State's citizens of liberty without due 
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be 
restricted by invidious racial discriminations. 
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or 
not marry, a person of another race resides with 
the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State." 
!i•, at 12. Thus, Lovin~ involved a denial of a 
freedom" on a wholly 4.upportable ~ is, "fundamental by 
" 
I/ ~ 
the use of classifications directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. II It does not speak to the level of 
judicial scrutiny, or of governmental justification/, for 
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom" 
'r. d' 'd 1n 1v1 uals to marry or to dissolve such ties. 
" 
5 • 
The starting point of analysis, in my view, is the 
recognition that domestic relations is "an area that has 
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the 
States." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 3939, 404 (1975). As 
early as Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878), the 
Court noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe 
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its 
own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it 
may be dissolved." 
The marriage relation traditionally has been 
subject to regulation, initially by the ecclesiastical 
authorities, and later by the secular state. The 
governmen~ representing the collective expression of the 
moral aspirations of a people, has an undeniable interest 
in ensuring that its rules of domestic relations reflect 
those values. "Marriage, as creating the most important 
relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and 
civilization of a people than any other institution, has 
always been subject to the control of the legislature. 
That body prescribes the age at which parties may contract 




to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute 
marriage, the duties and obligations it creates, its 
effects upon the property rights of both, present and 
prospective, and acts which may constitute grounds for its 
dissolution." Maynard v. Hil!_, 
I 
125 U.S. 109, 205 (1888) ~ 
, A re~:i.Ht@ eef "compelling state ,~ 
~~1-~~ 
~1'w,L,. ,,.t. ~ 
purpose" inquiry ii... 
" 
i~ ~@Rsi0'fl--wt-eh the network of restrictions that the states 
--\ 
_!_)r--~----~=-
have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce. Typical 
.f~ ~ rules banning incest, homosexuality and bigamy, fo r 
, f.~ ~ 
/;\.l '1V example, do not necessarily rest on any empirical 
~ 
basis but do reflect fundamental, longstanding moral 
judgments. Such judgments may override, in some instances 
genuinely held religious beliefs. So the Court held in 
Reynolds v. ~nited States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878): 
"Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred 
obligation, is nevertheless, in most civilized 
nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated 
by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, 
and out of its fruits spring social relations and 
social obligations and duties, with which 
government is necessarily required to deal. In 
fact, according as monogamous or poly~amous 
marriages are allowed, do we find thi principles 
on which the government of the people, to a 
greater or lesser extent, rests." 
The point is presented most clearly in the contex 
of traditional restrictions on the freedom of individuals 
to dissolve the bonds of =~~,; ,mfortMl:'\a~e l:lf'lien • .. 
I am not prepared to say that due process or equal 
7 • 
protection constitutionalizes the principle of "no-fault 
divorce." , e present trend is favor of making the opbion 
of divorce more fr ly available may reflect s6und public 
policy, but I see no wa ant for elev'a.ting this 
I 
development to a constitutio al plane simply because the 
r 
traditional barriers ~o divorce re founded on moral, 
rather than ubilitarian, empirically demonstrable, 
consid~rations, or may be underinclusive or overinclusive 
~ h respect to certain professed goals. 
II 
~J 
/,tate power over domestic relations is not without 
A 
constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a 
showing of justification "when the government intrudes on 
choices concerning family living arrangements" in a manner 
which is contrary to deeply rooted traditions Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, Ohio, U.S. , No. 75-6289, 
decided May 31, 1977, slip. op. 5-6, 8 (plurality opinion 
of Powell, J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform, U.S. , No. 
76-180, decided June 13, 1977, slip op. 25-30. There are 
also due process constraints on the extent to which the 
state may monopolize the process of ordering essential 
human affairs while excluding the truly indigent from that 
process. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
8. 
371 (1971). Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires generally that the means chosen by the state bear 
"a fair and substantial relation" to the object of the 
legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting 
Royster Guano Co. v. Vi_rginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); 
Craig v. Boren, U.S. , 97 s.ct. 451, 464 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass 
muster under either the due process or equal protection 
standard. Appellant identifies three objectives which are 
,t 
supposedly furthered by the statute in question: 
~ 
c;.) a 
""" counseling function; (1 ) an incentive to satisfy -. 
"""""' outstanding support obligations; and (3) a deterrent 
against incurring further obligationsa, :preew111a9;!.y ee the 
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted 
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute. 
Slip op. 13-14. No further discussion is required here. 
The so-called "collective device" rationale 
presents a somewhat more difficult question. I do not 
~s 
agree with the suggestion in the opinion o,j ~RQ majeEi~y 
1. 
that a state may never condition the right to marry on 
satisfaction of existing support obligations simply because 
the state has alternative methods of compelling such 
, .. 
9. 
payments. To the extent this restriction applies to 
J,a :,·~ 
genpin,e s.ce-ff~ who are ~reoen~y able to make the 
..J\ • 4,~'*r ~ ,Jo r.a4, .. JtJ 
required support payments butl\ deeliRe ta f!i9u !!JO, whetherout 
~e~~~n~~-~~tgQr in ~heir 
c;i,tody, the Constitution interposes no bar to this 
additional collection mechanism. The vice of the statute 
is not in the collection concept, but in the failure to 
make provision for the truly indigent who are presently 
without the means to comply with child support 
obligations. I ~d draw support from Justice Harlan's 
opinion ~Q~ e-l,,@,---Oe~,t in Boddie v. Connecticut. In that 
I 
case, the Court struck down filing fees for divorce actions 
as applied to those ~ able to pay, holding "that a 
'\ 
State may not consistent with the obligations imposed on it 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
preempt the right to dissolve this legal relationship 
without affording all citizens access to the means it has 
prescribed for doing so." 401 U.S., at 383. The 
monopolization present in this case is even more pervasive 
than in Boddie, for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign 





Rider A, p. 10 Zablocki 
It is to be remembered that the mar r iage applicant 
not only is required by the Wisconsin statute to submit 
proof of compliance with his support obligation; in 
addition, he must demonstrate - in some unspecified way -
that his child or children covered by the support order 
"are not then and are not likely thereafter to become 
.:i,' 
public charges~ I would question whether this provision,; 
~~c.~.t 
In short, the 
r<",e ~ 
oo~ld meetAany standard ofA~atioRalit~-
1.~ l;f ~ , .... e tt,tAu,tt-1 
state has made no showing of justification for 4tAstatute 
that wholly forecloses marriage to many of its citizens 
solely because of their indigency. 




The third justification, only obliquely advanced 
' I 
by appellant, is that the statute preserves the ability of 
marriage applicants to support their prior issue by 
preventing them from incurring new 3'l;lf W' obligations. 
of §245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to 
this objective, given the many ways that additional 
financial obligations may be incurred by the applicant 
quite apart from those likely to result from the 
contemplated marriage, that the classification "does not 
bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation." f_raig v. Boren, 97 s.ct. at 464 (Powell, J., 
concurring). See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 
supra, slip op. 5-6 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448-50 (1972) (plurality 
opinion of Brennan, J.) .. 
simply 
denial of the rig 
;u-··....,,-
satisfied all~ suppor 
issue remains or is 
can be rationally 
The state has fined the 
rt ~bligation to his p evious issue in 
; 
terms of 




disability barring the applicant from the 
privilege to marry until he is able to alter circumstances 
which ~F@aQA"l!!lqr may be beyond his control for all practical 
purposes. In such a situation, the statute "operates to 
the peculiar disadvantage of [a] class fairly defined as 
indigent," and the "lack of personal resources [will have] 
occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired 
benefit." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S • 
.. :. lJ)Mf, 
1, 22, 23 (1973). ~ Wisconsin has erected what is, in 
r: ,-:W.c..~ '~ .r.: ~ ,( '4 CA,,~ 
effect, a} 'means test" forJ-t+tese desiring to enter into the 
marriage relationship. Apparently, no other jurisdiction 
~~ 
has embraced this approach as a mQaR~ of reducing the 
of children on public assistance Put simply, the state 
showing of justification for this unprecedented 
~ ,.,....,_. ... ~ 
exclusion of the bona fide indigent from the exclusive 
~~~~:a~ rt, ~-•WA4.~ 
mea1 Lei ~g~aAa.i.&s@~Pl"Qi the marriage relationship. 
" I\ 
I concur in the judgment of the Court. 
lfp/ss 11/21/77 Rider A, p. 6 (Zablocki) 
In addition, state regulation has included blood 
tests as a precondition to marriage as well as bans on 




1. See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 
Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1429-32 (1974). 
/ 2. The ban on incestual pairing may be justified 
part on health considerations. Traditional incest 
restrictions, however, go beyond any health justification 
to encompass moral preconceptions, e.g., states often bar 
marriage to a dead brother's wife or matrimony between 
-4iQe~nt cousins. 
----·-· 
3 . Of course, Boddie was an "as applied" 
challenge; it does not require invalidation of §245.10 as 
unconstitutional on its face. In ordinary circumstances, 
the Court should merely require that Wisconsin permit those 
members of the appellee class to marry if they can 
demonstrate "the bona fides of [their] indigency," 401 
U.S., at 382. The statute in question, however, does not 
contain a severability clause, and the Wisconsin 
Legislature has made specific provision for the contingency 
that "utilization of the procedures [under §245.10] are 
stayed or enjoined by the order of any court." In the 
event of such stay or injunction, Chapter 105, Wisconsin 
Laws of 1977, §245.105(3) provides that "permission to 
remarry make likewise be granted to any petitioner who 
submits clear and convincing proof to the court that for 
reasonable cause he or she was not able to 
J , . 
N-2 
comply with a previous court obligation for child 
support." Suppl. Memorandum of Appellants and Appellees ·a, 
11. 
4 . , At oral argument counsel for appellant 
suggested that the statute merely contemplates an 
accounting of prior support obligations as a prerequisite 
to a new marriage, and that no license would be denied 
where accounts are fully settled simply because a child 
remains a public charge. Tr. of Oral Argument The 
plaintiff in the companion case, Leipzig v. Pallamolla, 418 -----
F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1976), however, had complied with 
his support obligations but was denied permission to marry : ~ 
because his four minor children received welfare benefits • 
• 
/tJSpyl,T 
A State may not lightly deny the privilege to marry 
on grounds of indigency. Such a condition, while 
theoretically not immutable, connotes a practical 
inability to alterp one's circumstances for the 
foreseeable future. Even where the ability to pay 
provides a basis for prediction, say, in screening 
the colorable from the frivolous in the administration 
of applications for legal relief from marriage or 
conviction, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 ( 1'111); 
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ,this Court 
has :t:0 11:i1::t=tl'" invalidated legislation which "operates to the 
peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly defined as 
indigent" by working "an absolute deprivation of the 
desired benefit" because of a lack of personal resources. 
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22, 23 
has not simply "fail[ed] to alleviate the consequences 
of differences in economic circumstances that exist 
wholly apa rt from any state action." Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The statute in this case tells the indigent that whether 
or not they have met their prior support olbigations~ 
they mRR may not marry tmt!i .r ,i 
~r~ 1) r- _, ,.. C. I, K ly +o !fo 
on public assistance , 
A. 
Supreme Court of the United Sw,tes 
Memorandum 
____________________ J_)__,_, __ ~_J_;19, ___  
Re: 76-879, Zablocki v. 
Redhail 
I am reasonably 
satisfied with this 
draft, although it 
may be a little longer 
you anticipated. I 
would like to flag fo r 
your attention the last 
two:~f~f. This is the 
part that gave me the 
most difficulty. -~ 
/J. p )h 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
Nov~mber 21, 1977 
-------------------------------------, 19 _______ _ 
Re Zablocki v. Redhail 
WHR's draft is persuasive 
until he gets to Part II, 
when he states that "[e]ven 
with ..Eegard to those fathers 
who a re absolutely unable 
to support their dependent 
children, the statute at 
least has the effect of 
reducimg the likelihood 
that they will acquire 
additional obligations." 
·k ,., ,'( 
Miles Ruthberg, TM's clerk, 
called me on Friday to say 
that TM's draft is being 
revised B~~as to limit its 
impact EIN."~the area of 
domestic relations. From what 
Miles said, I suspect that 
there will be little need 
-over-
... 
for a separate opinion from 
these chambers. 
~·( ,'( ,'( 
PS is writing a separate 
opinion striking down the 
Wisc. statute on a due 
process theory which is 
not very different f ~om 




~ltpttntt Q)' ttltd of tltt 1llmbh ~ht.Us 
~a:sJrhtghm. ~. cq. 20ffe)1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 16, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I again apologize for the lateness of my dissent in 
this case. I faithfully promise, subject to the vagaries 
of the printers, to have it circulated by Friday, and think 
I may be able to get it curculated tomorrow afternoon. 
Sincerely, / 
{;Jt)/ 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
: ; 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.®uprtntt QJ,tttd ttf t:Irt~h ~faftg 
~as:!ringbm. J. QJ. 2.clffe~.;l 
November 16, 1977 
Re: 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
My apologies for not responding promptly. I have 
difficulty with some of the broad language on pages 
12 and 13 of your circulation and spent some time trying 
to draft a possible suggested revision. Then, when I 
learned that Potter was writing separately, I decided to 
wait for his circulation. As soon as Potter circulates 
his draft, I'll give the case priority attention. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
; .,. . 
,ju:prttttt <4'cttrt of tfyt 'Jjlnittb j,t!ilia-
'ID1:1olritt9to1t, ~. <4. 211,SJ~~ 
CHAMB ERS Of' 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 16, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail 
It has been some three weeks since the proposed 
opinion in this case was circulated. What can I do to get 
it off dead center? 
8/fA . 
T. M. 
November 17, 1977 
No. 76-879 Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I should have advised you sooner that, after. too 
much delay, I am writing a concurring opjnion. 
My view of the appropriate constitutional analysis 
differs rather substantially from yours, although I am with 
you on the judgment. 
I'll try to be more dutiful next time! 
~;. Sincerely, , 
,: _t.· 
' ii'• t 
_, ,,. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
if:·,· 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
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.:§ttpTmu Qiamt of tqt ~th ;§taus 
~agfringhrtt. ~- QI. 2.0ffeJ!.J 
CHAMB E RS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
November 25, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to Conference 
J 
I 
Memorandum to: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Sam Estreicher 
Date: November 27, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879, Zablocki v. Redhail 
/ 
The attached changes reflect the combined 
efforts of Bob (as editor) and me. I hope they are not 
too illegible. I have not had the draft reprinted because 
I thought you would prefer to examine t he changes in the 
context of what previously appeared. 
I am somewhat uneasy about our rejection of 
the state's third justification( that the statute seeks 
to prevent the incurring of new obligations) because we 
are employing a heightaned measure of scrutiny without 
explicitly saying so. On pp. 7-8 of the Chambers Draft 
(and new insert for p . 7), I have attempted to identify 
what is wrong with the statute in terms which do not 
require explicit acknowledgment of a middle-tier standard 
of review. As I stated in the bench memo, the neatest 
way to handle the case would be to use a middle-tier 
approach, premised on the state's use of a poverty 
classification to block aeeeas to the exercise of the 
important privilege to marry, but such a resolution would 
seem foreclosed by your concurring opinion in Craig v. 
Boren. 
PS's analysis is not terribly different from 
our own, but his discourse against the use of the Equal 
Protection Clause prevents your joining his concurring 
opinion; you would be going on record that equal protection 





classification~ Although PS asserts a doctrinal preference 
for due process, reliance on equal protection gioee eke 
permits the states some freedom of action. For example, 
the"population explosi6n''.may develop such proportions that 
a state might rationally conclude an across-the-board 
limitation on the number of children per family is needed. 
(This condition obtains in India.) PS' substantive due 
process rationale may present a greater obstacle - to such 
a "solution" than would our poverty classification approach. 
·k/ Technically, a "join" could be limited to Part I of 
PS' opinion, although this might be read as a concurrence 
in the opening ~f as well,. 
CHAMBERS DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-879 
Thomas E. Zablocki, Milwaukee l On Appeal from the United 
County Clerk, Etc., Appellant, States Dis.trict Court for 
v. the Eastern District of 
Roger C. Redhail, Etc. Wisconsin. 
[November-, 19771] 
Mn. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
Alone among the States, Wisconsin denies a resident having 
minor issue not in his custody permission to marry unless he 
submits proof of compliance with outstanding child support 
obligations. In addition, he must demonstrate that such 
children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to become 
public charges." Wis. Stat. §§ 245.10 (1) , (4), (5) (1973). 
The prohibition is absolute, whether the marriage is solem-
nized within or without the State's borders. The State recog-
nizes common-law marriage. And persons obtaining marriage 
licenses in violation of § 245.10 are subject to criminal 
penalties. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court that these restric-
tions on the exclusive means of living together as husband and 
wife cannot withstand applicable constitutional standards. I 
write separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too 
broadly in an area which traditionally has been subject to 
plenary state regulation. In my view, the Court's reliance 
on concepts of "fundamental right to marry" and "critical 
examination" is neither mandated by the Constitution nor 
necessary to invalidate the restrictions in this case. 
I 
The Court apparently would subject all state regulation 
which "directly and substantially" interferes with tlrn decision 
to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical examina-
2 
76-879-CONCUR 
ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL 
tion" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Presumably, 
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with 
the decision to enter into the marital relationship may legiti-
mately be imposed." Slip. op. 12. No doctrinal basis is 
offered, however, for distinguishing between classifications 
which "interfere directly and substantially with the right to 
marry" and other restrictions which do not have this effect. 
Since state regulation in this area typically takes the form 
of a prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, the degree 
of direct interference with the decision to marry or to divorce 
will not provide a predictable test for state legislatures or a 
principled basis for judiciaJ oversight. 
On several occasions, the Court has recogn'ized the impor-
tance of the marriage relationship to the structure of values 
essential to organized society. ''This Court has Jong recog-
nized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974). 
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of personal 
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some ex-
tension to activiti0s relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 
399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " Roe v. Till ade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
( 1973). "While the outer limits of th.is aspect of privacy 
have not been marked by this Court, it is clear that among 
the decisions that an individual may rnal<:e without unjustified 
government interference are persona] decisions relating to 
marriage .... " Carey v. Populatfon Services International, 
- U. S. -, - , No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip 
op. 5. 
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and 
familial privacy which places substantive limits on the regula-
tory power of government.1 But the Court has yet to hold 
1 See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 14iO; 
1429-1432 (1972). 
I. . ,. 
• -~ 
< , .. ,, ' ,. 
.-,, 
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ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL 
that the presumption of constitutionality which attaches gen-
erally to legislation disappears simply because the government 
seeks to regulate the conditions of entry into or the dissolu-
tion of the marriage relationship. 
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1976). Although Loving speaks of the 
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the 
Court's focus ,vas rxplicitly on the miscegenation statute 
before it. Chief Justice Warren stated: 
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942). Sre also May-
nard v. Oklahoma, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifi-
cations so clirectly subversivr of the principle of equality 
at the heart of thr Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprive al1 of the State's citizens of liberty without due 
process of law. The Fourternth Amenclment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another 
race rrsicles with the individual and cannot be infringed 
by the State." 
Id., at 12. Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental 
freedom" on a whol1y unsupportable basis, by the use of 
classifications "directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment .... " It does not 
speak to the level of judicial scrutiny, or of governmental jus-
tification, for "supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental 
freedom" of individuals to marry or to dissolve such tics. 
The starting point of analysis, in my view, is the recogni-
tion that domestic relations is "an area that has long been 
regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States." 
4 
76-879-CONCUR 
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Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 3939. 404 (1975). As early as Pen~ 
noyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 734-735 ( 1878), the Court noted 
that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the conditions 
upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens 
shall be created. and the causes for which it may be dissolved." 
The marriage relation traditionally has been subject to 
regulation, initially by the ecclesiastical authorities. and later 
by the secular state. The Government. representing the col-
lective expression of the moral aspirations of a people, has 
an undeniable interest in ensuring that its rules of domestic 
relations reflect those values. "Marriage, as crea.ting the most 
important relation in life. as having more to do with the 
morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, 
has always been subject to the control of the legislature. 
That body prescribes the age at ,vhich parties may contract 
to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute mar-
riage, the duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the 
property rights of both, present and prospective, and acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 109. 205 (1888). In addition. state 
regulation has included blood tests as a precondition to mar-
riage as well as bans on incest, bigamy and homosexuality. 
A "compelling state purpose" standard or inquiry would cast 
doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have 
fashioned to govern marriage and divorce. 2 
2 Typical rules banning incest , homosC'xnality and bigamy, for example, 
do not nccess:1rily rest on :rny empiric:1.l basis but do reflcrt fund:1mental, 
longstanding moral judgments. Snrh judgments may overridr, in some 
inst:1nce~, genuinely held rrligious brlicfs. So the Court held in Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U. S. 145, 165-166 (1878): 
"Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, 
in most civilized nntions, :1 civil contract, and usunlly rcguhted by law. 
Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social 
relations and socinl obligations and duties, with which government is 
necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monognmous or poly-
l\ I 
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II 
5 
But state power over domestic relations is not without 
constitutional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a 
showing of justification "when the government intrudes on 
choices concerning family living arrangem('nts" in a manner 
which is contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, Ohio, - U. S. -, No. 75- 6289, decided 
May 31, 1977, slip. op. 5-6. 8 (plurality opinion of PowELL, 
J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
& Reform, - U. S. - , - , No. 76-180, decided June 13, 
1977, slip op. 25-30. There are also due process constraints 
on the extent to which the State may monopolize the process 
of ordering essential human affairs while excluding the truly 
.indigent from that process. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 
371 (1971). Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause 
requires generally that the means chosen by the State bear 
"a fair and substantial relation" to the object of the legisla-
tion. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting Royster 
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920); Craig v. 
Boren, - U. S. --, -, 97 S. Ct. 451 , 464 (PowmLL, J., 
concurring). 
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster 
under either the due process or equal protection standard. 
Appellant identifies three objectives which are supposedly fur-
thered by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function; 
(ii) an incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations; 
and (iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. 
The opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the 
gamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the 
government of the people, to a greater or lesser extent, rests." 
The point is presented most clearly in the context of traditional restric-
tions on the freedom of individuals to dissolve the bonds of ma.rtimony. I 
am not prepared to say that due process or equal protection constitu-
tionalizes the principle of "no-fault divorce." 
6 
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asserted counseling objective bea.rs no relation to this statute. 
Slip op. 13- 14. No further discussion is required here. 
The so-ca11ed "collective device" rationale presents a some-
what more difficult question. I do not agree with the sugges-
tion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition 
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obliga-
tions simp]y because the State has alternative methods of 
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction 
applies to persons who are able to make the required support 
payments but simply wish to shrink out their moral and legal 
obligation, the Constitution interposes no bar to this addi-
tional collection mechanism. The vice of the statute is not 
in the collection concept. but in the fai]ure to make provision 
for the truly indigent who are presently without the means 
to comply with child-support obliga.tions. I draw support 
from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie v. Cor1r1ecticut. In 
that case. the Court struck down filing fees for divorce actions 
as applied to those wholly unable to pay, holding "that a 
State may not consistent with the obligations imposed on it 
by the Due Process Clanse of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relationship without 
affording all citizens a.ccess to the means it has prescribed 
for doing so." 401 U.S .. at 383. The monopolization nresent 
in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie, for Wiscon-
sin will not recognize foreign marriages which fail to conform 
to the requirements of § 245.10.3 
a Of com'Sr , Boddie was an "as applied" rhallrngr: it dorR not 1w111ire 
invalidation of ~ 245.10 ns unrons1i1u1ionnl on it i:; fore . In ordinar~' rir-
cumstanrrs , 1 hr Court should mrrrl:v rrq11irr that Wisronsin prrmit those 
membrrs of the apprllrr rl nss to mnrr~, if 1hrv rnn drmorn,tratr "thr bona 
fidrs of rtheir] indigrnr:v," 401 U . S., nt 382. Thr stnt11tr in q11rstion , 
howcvrr , dors not rontnin n srvcrnbilit~, rlnusr, nnd thr Wisconsin Lrgis-
lature has madr sprrifir proYision for thr rontingrnrv thnt "u1 ilizntion of 
the prorcdnrrs r11ndrr ~ 245.10] nrr stn:vrd or rnjoinrcl by thr ordrr of 
any court." In thr evrnt of snrh R1a~, or inj11n r tion . Chantrr 10.5, Wis-
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The third asserted justification, only obliquely advanced 
by appellant, is that the statute preserves the ability of mar-
riage applicants to support their prior issue by preventing 
them from incurring new obligations. The challenged provi-
sions of § 245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to 
this objective, given the many ways that additional financial 
obligations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from 
those likely to result from the contemplated marriage, that the 
classification "does not bear a fair and substantial relation to 
the object of the legislation." Craig v. Boren , 97 S. Ct., at 
464 (POWELL, J., concurring). See Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, supra, slip op. 5-6 (plurality opinion of 
PowELL, J.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 448-450 
(1972) (plurality opinion of BRENNAN, J.). 
It is to be remembered that the marriage applicant not only 
is required by the Wisconsin i::tatute to submit proof of com-
pliance with his support obligation; in addition, he must 
demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that his child or chil-
dren covered by the support order "are not then and are not 
likely thereafter to become public charges." 4 I would ques-
tion whether this provision meets any standard of review. 
Apparently, no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach 
as a method of reducing the rolls of children on public assist-
ance. In short, the State has made no showing of justifica-
make likrwise be granted to an:v petitioner who submits clear and convinc-
ing proof to the court that for rrasonable cause he or . he was not able to 
comply with a previous court obliga1ion for child support ." Suppl. 
Memorandum of Apprllants and Apprllees 8, 11. 
4 At oral argument coumirl for appellant suggested that the f-tatute 
merely contemplatrs an arro1mting of prior support obligations as a prere-
quisite to a JlC'W marringr, and ihat no lirense would be drnied where 
accounts are full~, settled simpbr brrause a child remains a public charge. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. -. The plaintiff in the rompanion ca~e, Leipzig v. 
Pallamolla, 418 F. Supp. 1073 (ED Wi,;. 1976). however, had complied 
with his support obligaiion~ but was denied prrmi ·sion to marry because 
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tion for an unprecedented statute that wholly forecloses mar-
riage to many of its citizens solely because of their indigency, 
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MR. JUSTICE PowELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's 
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital 
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1). (4). and (5) (1973), 
cannot withstand applicable constitutional standards. l write 
separately because the h1ajority's raitionale sweeps too broadly 
in an area which traditionally has been subject to plenary state 
regulation. The Court apparently would subject all state 
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes with 
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical 
examination" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Pre-
sumably, "reasonable regulations that do not significantly 
interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed.'' Slip. op. 12. The Court does 
not present. however. any principled means for distinguishing 
between the types of regulations. Since state regulation in 
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier 
to marriage or divorce. the degree of "direct" interference with 
the decision to marry or to divorce is u11likely to provide either 
guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight. 
I 
On several occasions. the Court has recognized the impor-
tance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values 
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nized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourter~nth Amendment." Cleveland 
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632. 639-640 (1974). 
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of personal 
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some ex-
tension to activities relating to lllarriage. Loving v. Virginia, 
399 lT. S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " foe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973). "While th<' outer limits of this aspect of privacy 
have not been marked by this Court, it is clear that among 
the decisions that an individual may 1nake without unjustified 
government interference arc personaJ decisions relating to 
marriage .... " Carey v. Population Services International, 
- U. S. -, -, No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip 
op. 5. 
Thus, it is fair to sti,y that there is a right of marita.J and 
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the 
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to 
hold that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a 
"fundamentaJ right" triggering the most exacting judicial 
scrutiny.1 
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 ( 1967). Although Loving speaks of the· 
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vita.I persona.I rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the 
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief 
Justice Warren stated: 
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man.' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. 
1 Although the c/ls~s cited in the text, indicnte thnt there is a sphere of 
privacy or autonomy smrounding nn existing mnritnl relntionshjp into 
which the Stnte mny not lightly intrude, the~· do not necps,;arily 8uggest 
that the smne barrier of justification blocks regulation of the conditions of' 
ent r~, into or the dis;;olution of the marital bond. See genernlly Henkin, 
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Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535, 541 (1942). See also May-
nard v. Oklahoma, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes. classifi-
cations so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprive all of the State's citizens of liberty without clue 
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution. 
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another 
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed 
by the State." Id., at 12. 
Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom" 
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications 
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of 
the Fourteenth A.mendmept .... " It does not speak to the 
level of judicia.1 scrutjnyl of, or governmental justification for. 
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom" of 
individuals to marry or divorce. 
In my view. analysis must start from the recognition of 
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as 
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 404 ( 1975). The nuirriage relation tradition-
ally has been subject to regulation . initially by the ecclesias-
tical authorities, and later by the secular state. As early as 
Pennoyer v. l-·:ejJ, 95 U. S. 714. 734- 735 (1878). this Court 
noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the coqdi-
tions upon which the m~rriage relation between its own citi-
zens shall be created. and the causes for which it may be 
dissolved." The State. representing the collective expression 
of moral aspirations. has an undeniahle interest in ensuring 
that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held 
values of its people. 
"Marriage, 11s creating the most important relation in 
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization 
4 
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of a people than any other institutioll. has always been 
subject to the control of the legislature. That body pre-
scribes the age at which pa.rties may contract to marry, 
the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the 
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the 
property rights of both. present and prospective, and acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U. S.190, 205 (1888). 
State regulation has included bans on incest, bigamy and 
homosexuality. as well as various preconditions to marria.ge, 
such as blood tests. 'Likewise, a showing of fault on the part 
· of one of the ·partners traditionally has been a f.l'F8QQtHlitior~ to 1' ,e f'V\'-' 's I+ e. 
'the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling st~te 
·purpose" standard or inquiry would cast doubt on the network 
of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern mar-
. riage and divorce. 
II 
State power over domestic relations is not without constitu-
tional limits. The· Due Process Clause requires a showing of 
· justification "when the government intrudes 011 choices con-
cerning family living arrangements" in a manner which is 
contrary to ·deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U. S. 494, 499. 503-504 (1977) (plurality 
opinion of PowELL.-J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform, - U. S. -. -. No. 
--76-180. decided June 13. 1977. slip op. 25-30. Due process 
constraints also limit the extent to which tpe State may 
monopolize the process of ordering certain h uh1an relationships 
while excluding the truly indigent from that process. Boddie 
v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Furthermore. the 
Equal Protection Clause requires generally that the means 
chosen by the State bear "a fair and substa.ntial relation" to 
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. 76 
' (H>71), quoting Royst(Jr G·«ano Co, v .. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,. 
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ZABLOCKI v. REDHAlL 5 
415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 210-211 (1976) 
(POWELL, J. , concurring). 
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster 
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appel-
lant identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered 
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling functiori; (ii) an 
incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations; and 
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The 
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted 
counseling objective bears no relation to this sta.tute. Slip op. 
13-14. No further discussion is required here. 
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a some-
what more <lifficult question. I do not agree with the sugges-
tion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition 
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obliga-
tions simply because the State has altemative methods of 
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction 
applies to persons who are able to make the required support 
payments but simply wish to shirk their moral and legal 
obligation. the Constitution interposes no bar to this addi-
tional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the 
collection concept. but in the failure to make provision for 
those without the means to comply with child-support obliga-
tions. I. draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie 
v. Connecticut. In that case. the Court struck down filing fees 
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay. 
holding "tha.t a State may no~consistent with the obliga.tions 
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal rela.tion-
ship without affording all citizens access to the means it has 
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S .. at 383. The monopoliza-
tion present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie, 
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages which fail 
to conform to the requirements of~ 245.10.~ 
~ Of course, Boddie was an "as applied" challenge; it. does not requiro 
0 
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The third Justification. only obliquely advanced by appel-
lant. is that the statute preserves the ability of marriage 
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them 
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of 
§ 245.10 are so grossly underinclusive with respect to this 
Qbjective. given the many ways that additional financial obli-
gations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from lL 
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 
Craig v. Boren, 129 U. S .. at 211 (POWELl,, J .. concurring). 
Ree Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438. 447-450 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion of BnENNA~. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land, Ohio, 431 U. S., at 499-500 (plurality opinion of PowELL, 
J.). 
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin 
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obliga-
tion. but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that 
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to 
become public charges."~ This statute does more than simply 
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic 
invalidation of § 245.10 a" 1mcorn;t it ut ional on its face. In ordinarr cir-
cumstances, the Court "ho11ld merPI~· rrq11ire thnt Wiscon,;in prrmit those 
members of the nppellee clns;: to man~· if tlwy cnn drmon,,irate "the bonn 
tides of rtheir] indigenc~·." 401 ll . S., nt 382. Thr stntutr in qurstion. 
however. doc,; not contnin n 1'Pvcral1ility rln11se. nnd the Wisconsin Lrgis-
lnturc hn,.; made ,;pecifir provision for thr contingency tlrnt "utilization of 
the procrdum; r11nder § 245.IOJ Hf(' stn~·ecl or rnjoined b~· the order of 
any court." In thr rvent of such stn~· or injunction. Chnpter 105, Wis-
corn;in Ln,w of 1977. § 245.105 (3) proviclr;,; that " permi:;sion to remarry 
may likewise be grnntrd to any prtit ionrr who submit,, rlear and c01n-incing 
proof to the rourt thnt for reni:;01111ble raur,;r he or shr wn~ not ablr to 
comply with a previou~ court obligation for child :::upport." Suppl. 
1\Trmornndum of Apprllant,.: and Appr-llPes 8. 11. 
~ The plaintiff in t11e companion Cfl8C, Leipzig v. Pallarnolla, 418 F. Supp. 
1073 (ED Wis. 1976) had complied with hi,; support obligation:,; but wa3 
denied permission to marry bccnuse hi~ fo11r minor rhildren received welfare 
benefits. 
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circumsta.nces that exist wholly apart from any state action." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan. J .. . dissent-
ing). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their 
support obligations or not. that they may not marry so long as 
their children are public chargE'!s or there is a danger that their 
QAikJren are f>1.1bli0 0Aarg0s Qf t1'0r0 is a Elazng0r tAat t1'0ir· 
childrep might go on public assistance in the future. Appar-
ently, no other jurisdiction has embqiced this approach as a 
method of reducing the rolls of children on public assistance. 
Because the State has not est11blished a justifica.tion for this 
unprec~dented foreclosure of marriage to many of its citizens 
solely because of their indigency, I poncur in the judgment of 
the Court. 
..S +'11,.s -h c. GkQlll_j-t.5 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's 
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital 
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1), (4), and (5) (1973). 
cannot .. ithstttnd applicable constitutional standards. I write 
separately because the majority's rationale sweeps too broadly 
in an area which traditionally has been subject to ph~JHlfY state ~ ~r'V 4.5 I\J t.. 
regula.tion. The Court apparently would subject all "state 
regulation which "directly and substantially" interferes with 
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical 
examination" or "compelling state interest" ana.Jysis. Pre-
sumably. "reasonable regulations thatJ do not significantly 
interfere with the deci,sion to enter into the marital relationship + 
may legitimately be imposed."A ~lir~. QJ::J. 12. The Court does A ""+e I ct 
not present, however, any principled means for distinguishing 
between the"" types of regula.tions. Since state regulation in 
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier 
to marriage or divorce. the degree of "direct" interference with 
the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely to provide either 
guid~nce for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight. 
I 
On several occasious. the Court has recognized the impor-
tance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values 
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nized that freedom of perso11al choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland 
Board of Educati011 v. LaFleur. 414 U. 8. 632. 639-640 (H)74). 
Our decisions make clear that the guarantee of persona] 
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some ex-
tension to activities relating to rnarriage, Loving v. Virgi-ll'ia, 
399 U. R. 1. 12 (1967) .... " Roe y. lFade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973). "While tlw outer limits of this aspect of privacy 
have not been marked by the Court. it is clear that among 
the decisio1;s that a11 individual may make without u11justifiecl 
government interference are personal decisions 'relating to 
marriage ... .'" Carey v. Population Services International, 
- U. S. -, -, No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip 
op. 5. 
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and 
familial privacy which p1aces some substantive limits on the 
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to 
hold that all regulation touchi11g upon marriage implicates a 
"fundamental -right" triggering the most exacting judicial 
scrutiny.1 
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Although Loving speaks of the 
"freedom to marry" as "one of the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orc!erly pursuit of happiness by free men." the 
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief 
Justice Warren stated: 
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man .' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival. Ski1mer v. 
1 Although the ca~e:,; eited in thr trxt indiea tr that t hrrr iR a sphrrr of' 
privacy or nntonomy surrounding an rxi"ting marital rclation:;hip into· 
whirh the StHlr mn~· not light!~· intrudr, the~· do not nere~.,:arily "uggest 
that. the ,;ame barrier of ju,-tifiration bloek~ regulation of the condition,.; of 
entry into or the dissolution of the marital bond. See genrrnlly Hrnkin,. 
l)rivaq· and_ Autonomy, ~4 Colutn. L. Hev .. 1410, 1429-14:{2 (1974) ,. 
76-879-CONCUR 
ZABLOCKI v. REDHAIL 3 
Oklahoma, 316 F. 8. 535. 541 ( H>42). See also May~ 
nard v. Oklahoma, 125 U. 8. 190 (1888). To deny this 
fundamental freedom 011 so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes. classifi-
cations so directly· subversivf' of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. is surely to 
deprive all of the State's citizens of liberty without due 
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedo111 of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another 
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed 
by the State." Id., at 12. 
Thus, Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom" 
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications 
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of 
the Fourteenth Amendment .... " It does not speak to the 
level of judicia.J scrutiny of, or governmental justification for. 
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundipnental freedom" of 
individuals to T)1arry or divorce. 
In my view. analysis must start from the recognition of 
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as 
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975). The p1arriage relation tradition-
ally has been subject to regulation. initially by the ecclesias-
tical authorities. anp later by the secular state. As early as 
Permoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 734-735 ( 1877). this Court 
noted that a State 'fhas absolute right to prescribe the condi-
tiops upon which the marriage relation between its own citi-
zens shall be crea~d. and the causes for which it may be 
dissolved." The Stp.te, representing the collective expression 
of moral aspir&tions, has an undeniable interest in ensuring 
that· its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held 
values of its people. 
"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in 
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of a people than any other institution. has always been 
subject to the control of the legislature. That body pre-
scribes the age at which parties may contract to ma.rry, 
the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the 
duties and obligations it creates. its effects upon the 
property rights of both. present and prospective, and acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190. 205 (1888). 
State regulation has included bans on incest. bigamy, and 
homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage, 
such as blood tests. Likewise, a showing of fault on the part 
of one of the partners traditionally has been a prerequisite to 
the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling state 
· pµrpose" standard or inquiry would cast doubt on the network 
of restrictions that the Stfttes have fashioned to govern mar-
ri1tge and divorce. 
II 
State power over domestic relations is not without constitu-
tiona.J limits. The Due Process Clause requires a showing of 
justification "when the government intrudes on choices con-
cerning family living arrangements" in a manner which is 
contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 4~1 F. S. 494, 499, 503-504 (1977) ( plurality 
opinion of POWELL, J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & R eform , - U. S. - . - . Nos. 
76-180. et al.. decided June 13. 1977. slip op. 25- 30. Due 
process constraints also limit the extent to which the State 
may monopolize the process of ordering certain h uma11 rela-
tiooships while excluding the truly indigent from that process. 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971). Furthermore, 
under the Equal Protection Clause the means chosen by the 
State in this case must bear "a fair and substantial relation '' to 
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 
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415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 210-211 ( 1976) 
(POWELL. J., concurring). 
The Wisconsin n:ieasure in this case does not pass muster 
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appel-
lapt identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered 
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function; (ii) an 
incentive to satisfy outstanding support obligations; and 
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The 
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted 
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute. Slip op. 
13-14. No further discussion is required here. 
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a some-
what more difficult questio1:i. I do not agree with the sugges-
tion in the Court's opinion thl'lt a State may never condition 
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obliga-
tions simply because the State has alternative methods of 
co1npelling such payments. To the extent this restriction 
applies to persons who are 11,ble to make the required support 
payments but simply wish to 'shirk their moral and legal 
obligation. the Constitution interposes np bar to this addi-
tional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the 
collection concept, but in the failure to make provision for 
those without the means to comply with child-support obliga-
tions. I draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie 
v. Connecticut. In that case, the Court struck down filing fees 
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay. 
holding "that a State may not, consistent with the obligations 
imposed on it by tqe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Arµendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal rela.tion-
ship without affording all citizens access to the means it has 
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S., at 383. The monopoliza-
tion present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie, 
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages that fail 
'to conform to the requirements of § 245.10/ 
:i Of course, Boddie wm; an "as applied" challenge; it, does not require 
·'' 
·. 
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The third justificatio11. only obliquely advanced by appel-
lant, is that tlw statute preserves the ability of marriage 
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them 
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of 
§ 245.10 are so grossly un<lerinclusive with respect to this 
objective. given the many ways that additional financial obli-
gations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from a 
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S .. at 211 (POWELL, J .. concurring). 
·see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 l.J. S. 438. 447-450 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion of BRENNAN. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
la.nd, Ohio, 431 e. S .. at 499-500 (plurality opinion of POWELL, 
J.). 
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin 
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obliga-
tion. but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that 
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to 
become public charges.'':, This statute does more than simply 
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic 
i11validatio11 of § 2~.5.10 :l:- u11ro11,.;!itu1io11al 011 it,- fiwr. fo onlu1ary c·ir-
eum:-tnnc•ei,;, thr Court ,-houkl nwrrl~· rrquirP that Wi:,;ro11,-i11 Jl('t'l11it tho,.;p , 
member,- of tlw appelkr rJa,.;,. to · man~· if t lw~· r:111 demo11:,:t r:d!' "the bo11a 
fidr$ of rt1wir] i11digrnr~·." ~01 l'. s .. :It :3S2. Thr :,tatut!' ill qur,-tion .. 
hqwr,·(' r. doe,- 1101 1·011t:1i11 a ,-r,·c•r:ihilit.,· f'lau,-r. :111d tlw Wi,-eo11,.;i11 Lrgi,.;-
latun' ha,.; mndr ,-pc•C'ific· prm·i:,:io11 for t lH' c•o111 inµ;rnc·~· that "111 iliz:\t ion of 
thr prorrdmr,.; I 1111drr § '.!~5.10 11w~· br! ,.;ta~·<'CI or r11joi11!'d h~· thr orclrr 
of :111~· rourt." f11 tlH' ('Hilt ol' ,.;1H'h :1 :,:tay or i11j11nction aftl'r Frbru:u·~· 1, 
19ii\. Ch:1ptrr 105. Wi,.;ron"in Law, of 1977. § :HS.105 (:{) proYiclr,.; that 
" pc'rmi:,;,.;ion to rrm:1 n~· Illa~· likc•\\'i,.;r hr gm nt!'d to :111~· 1wt it ionrr \\'ho 
s11hmit,.; rll':\I' a11d c·on,·i1H'ing proof to ilw c·o11rt that for rra.,011:iblr ra11,.;r · 
hr or "hi' wa,.; 11ot able to c·ompl~· with n prrYiou:- romt obligatio11 for rhild 
~11pport ." Suppl. ,1P111or:111d11m of Apprll:int,- and Apprllrr,.; 10. 11. 
~ Thr plni11tiff i11 the eomp:111io11 en,.;!', Leipzig,·. Pallm110/la. 418 F. S11pp . . 
1073 (ED Wi:,;. 197li) hnd romplird with hi:,: ,.;11pport obligatio11,. but wa!'t 
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circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state action." 
Griffin v. lllino'is, 351 F. S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan. J .. dissent-
ing). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their 
support oblig&tions or not. that they may not marry so Jong as 
their children are public charges pr there is a danger that their 
children might go on public assistance in the future:' Appar-
ently. no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach as a 
I 
method of reducing the~ of child rep on public assistance. 
Because the State has not established a justification for this 
unprecedented foreclosure of marriage to many of its citizens 
solely because of their i11digency, I concur in the judgment of 
the Court. 
4 Quite a.pnrf from n11y impart 011 the f rnl~· indige11t. the 8tatutc appeirns 
to "ro11fer IIJ)Oll rt11C j11dgr] II lirPII"'(' !'or arbitra.r~· prurrdm(•," Krnt ,·. 
United States, :~8~ r. S. 5-H. 55;~ (HlfiU), in t.he dctrrmi11ation whrthf'I' an 
npplie1111t'~ rhildrrn arc '·likcl~· thel'(•nfter to bt•romP public clwrgr"." A 
Reriou:,; que:;f ion of proerdma I dur proee"'" i:; ra i~NI b~· t hi~ fen turr of 
:atnndnrdle;;::. di;;errtion, partirularly in light of the haiard~ of prediction 
in this area. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Rochester, Minnesota 
December 8, 1977 
Re: No. 76-879 - Zablocki v. Redhail 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely, 
H.A.B, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 







Insert fo,--p. 7 (add as new footnote 11 ) F, le/ /J 1). 
1ec.v ~ ,,_ 7 & -
4/ ~ ~Ji.ehnquist suggests that no meaningful line 
can be drawn between a statute that imposes a severe legal i{ ::}-1 
disability on the basis of indigency and a social welfare 
measure that fails to reach the entire universe of need for 
:f 
public assistance in the proces~'of allocating limited 
public welfare funds among a myriad of potential recipients." 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970). See post, 
at 2-3. The recognition of xiE such a distinction, however, 
informs many of our decisions upholding the use of 
prophylactic, necessarily imprecise, rules of el i.gibil ity 
in public assistance and social insurance programs. As 
we stated in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776 (1975), 
"[c]ommercial insurance policies have traditionally relied : " 
upon fixed, prophylactic rules to protect against abuses 
which could expand liability beyond the risks which are 
within the general concept of its coverage ..•• When the 
Government chooses to follow this tradition in its own social 
insurance programs, it doe s Hnot come up against a constitutional 
stone wall." This view was recently reaffirmed in Califano v. 
Jobst, No. 76-860, decided November 8, 1977, slip op. 6: 
"General rules are essential if a fund of this 
-2-
magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, 
even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitnary 
consequences in some individual cases. Weinberger v. Salfi, 
422 u.s. 749, 776." 
Governmental reluctance to finance particular 
activity protected against affixmxxi~e official interference 
by the Constitution is simply not the equivalent of a 
legal barrier, based on indigency, to the exercise of that 
activity. The contrasting approaches taken in Boddie and 
Jobst reflect this point. Perhaps a more dramatic 
illustration can be found in Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 
2382-83 (1977), where we held that a legi s l ative determination 
to reimburse the medical costs of childbirth while declining 
to provide coverage for expenses relating to nonthereapeutic 
aborLions did not offend the Equal Protection Clause. Althongh 
indigent women might find it extraordinarily difficult, 
if not impossible, to exercise the "fundamental right" 
recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the 
~ 
state ha,'imposed no restriction on access to abortions 
that was not already there." The Co- rt in Maher noted: 
"Our conclusion signals no retreat from Roe or the cases 
applying it. There is a basic difference between direct 
state interference with a protected activity and state 
encouragement of an alternative activity 
.. • 
consonant with legislative po ll<\;iy. Constitutional concerns 
are greatest when the State 
A +t~"'1 i) t.$ 
to impose its will . " 
by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions 
deemed to be in the public interest is t11=:1::a: .... ~ 
necessarily far .- broader." 
~ d.~~ 
To: The Chief Justice 
Ml". Juattce Brennan 
P.k Mr. Justice Stewart Mr. Justice White 
Mr. ,Ju:3t :tc0 M9.x-shal l 
Mr . .Tnsti.ce B 1. a i:1 b :mn 
Mr. ,Ju~ t:l.c.:e R:-hnqd l5t 
Mr. Justice Stevcms 
From: Mr. Justice Powell 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-879 . 
Thomas E. Zablocki, Milwaukee On Appeal from the United 
County Clerk, Etc., Appellant, States District Court for 
v. the Eastern District of 
Roger C. Redhail, Etc. Wisconsin. 
[November - , 1977] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court that Wisconsin's 
restrictions on the exclusive means of creating the marital 
bond. erected by Wis. Stat.~~ 245.10 (1), (4), and (5) (1973), 
cannot meet applicable constitutional standards. I write sep-
arately because the majority's rationale sweeps too broadly in 
an area which traditionally has been subject to pervasive state 
regulation. The Court apparently would subject all state 
regulation which "directly and substa.11tially" interferes with 
the decision to marry in a traditional family setting to "critical 
examination" or "compelling state interest" analysis. Pre-
sumably. "reasonable regulations that do not significantly 
interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship 
may legitimately be imposed." Ante, at 12. The Court does 
not present. however. any principled means for distinguishing 
between the two types of regulations. Since state regulation in 
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier 
to marria.ge or divorce. the degree of "direct" interfere11ce with 
the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely to provide either 
guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight. 
I 
On several occasions. the Court has ~sgni1'8'.k,the impor- ~~e/p--1,' 
tance of the marriage relationship to the maintenance of values 
essential to Ol'ga11ized society. "This Court has long recog-
2 
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nized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland 
Board of Educatio11 v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 632, 639-640 (1974). 
Our decisions mt.Jee BJef!'rA that the guarantee of personal ~~ 
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable govern-
mental interference by the Due Process Clause "has some ex-
tension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 
399 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) .... " Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
( 1973). "While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy 
have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among 
the decisions that an individual may make without unjustified 
government interference are personal decisions 'relating to 
marriage .... ' " Carey v. Population Services International, 
- U. S. -, -, No. 75-443, decided June 7, 1977, slip 
op. 5. 
Thus, it is fair to say that there is a right of marital and 
familial privacy which places some substantive limits on the 
regulatory power of government. But the Court has yet to 
hold that all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a 
"fundamental right" triggering the most exacting judicial 
scrutiny.1 
The principal authority cited by the majority is Loving v. 
Virginw, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Although Loving speaks of the 
"freedom to marry" as "one of. the vital personal rights essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," the 
Court focused on the miscegenation statute before it. Chief 
Justice Warren stated : 
"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. 
1 Although the cases cited in the text indicate that there is a sphere of 
privacy . or autonomy surrounding an existing marital relationship into 
which the State may not lightly intrude, they do not n<>cessarily suggest 
that the same barrier of justification blocks regulation of the conditions of 
entry into or the dissolution of the marital bond. See generally Hen)<in,. 
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Oklahoma, 316 U. R. 535, 541 (1942). See also May-
nard v. OA-lahoma, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this 
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifi-
cations so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to 
deprive all of the Rtate's citizens of liberty without due 
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, 
the freedom to marry. or not marry, a person of another 
race resiclcs with the individual and cannot be infringed 
by the State." Id., at 12. 
Thus. Loving involved a denial of a "fundamental freedom" 
on a wholly unsupportable basis-the use of classifications 
"directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of 
the Fourteenth Amendment .... " It does not speak to the 
level of judicial scrutiny of. or governmental justification for. 
"supportable" restrictions on the "fundamental freedom" of 
individuals to marry or divorce. 
In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of 
domestic relations as "an area that has long been regarded as 
a virtually exclusive province of the States." Sosna v. Iowa, 
419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975). The marriage relation tradition-
ally has been subject to regulation, initially by the ecclesias-
tical authorities. and lat<>r by the secular state. As early as 
Pen1wyer v. Neff, 95 U. R. 714. 734-735 (1877). this Court 
noted that a State "has absolute right to prescribe the condi-
tions upon which the marriage relation between its own citi-
zens shall be created. and the causes for which it may be 
dissolved." The State. representing the collective expression 
of moral aspirations, has an undeniable interest in ensuring 
that its rules of domestic relations reflect the widely held 
values of its people. 
"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in 
life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization 
' .. . 
4 
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of a people than any other institution , has .always been 
subject to the control of the legislature. That body pre-
scribes the age at which parties may contract to ma.rry. 
the procedure or form essential to constitute ma.rriage, the 
duties and obligations it creates, its effects upon the 
property rights of both. present a.nd prospective, and acts 
which may constitute grounds for its dissolution." May-
nard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190,205 (1888). 
State regulation has included bans on incest. bigamy, and 
homosexuality, as well as various preconditions to marriage, 
such as blood tests. Likewise, a showing of fault on the part 
of one of the partners traditionally has been a prerequisite to 
the dissolution of an unsuccessful union. A "compelling state 
purpose" inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restric-
tions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and 
divorce. 
II 
State power over domestic relations is not without constitu-
tional limits. The Due Process Clause requires a showing of 
justification "when the government intrudes on choices con-
cerning family living arrangements" in a ma,nner which is 
,contrary to deeply rooted traditions. Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U. S. 494, 499, 503- 504 ( 1977) (plurality 
opinion of PowELL, J.). Cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster 
Families for Equality & Reform, - U. S. - , - , Nos. 
76-180, et al., decided June 13, 1977. slip op. 25- 30. Due 
process constraints also limit the extent to which the State 
may monopolize the process of ordering certain human rela-
tionships while excluding the truly indigent from that process. 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 ( 1971). Furthermore, 
under the Equa1 Protection Clause the means chosen by the 
State in this case must bear "a fair and substantial relation" to 
the object of the legislation. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 , 76 
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415 (1920); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 21~211 (1976) 
(POWELL, J., concurring). 
The Wisconsin measure in this case does not pass muster 
under either due process or equal protection standards. Appel-
lant identifies three objectives which are supposedly furthered 
by the statute in question: (i) a counseling function; (ii) an 
incentive to satisfy outsta.nding support obliga.tions; and 
(iii) a deterrent against incurring further obligations. The 
opinion of the Court amply demonstrates that the asserted 
counseling objective bears no relation to this statute. Ante, at 
13-14. No further discussion is required here. 
The so-called "collection device" rationale presents a some-
what more difficult question. I do not agree with the sugges-
tion in the Court's opinion that a State may never condition 
the right to marry on satisfaction of existing support obliga-
tions simply because the State has alternative methods of 
compelling such payments. To the extent this restriction 
applies to persons who are able to make the required support 
payments but simply wish to shirk their moral a.nd legal 
obligation. the Constitution interposes no bar to this addi-
tional collection mechanism. The vice inheres not in the 
collection concept, but in the failure to make provision for 
those without the means to comply with child-support obliga-
tions. I draw support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Boddie 
v. Connecticut. In that case. the Court struck down filing fees 
for divorce actions as applied to those wholly unable to pay. 
holding "that a State may not, consistent with the obligations 
imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, pre-empt the right to dissolve this legal relation-
ship without affording all citizens access to the means it has 
prescribed for doing so." 401 U. S .. at 383. The monopoliza-
tion present in this case is even more pervasive than in Boddie, 
for Wisconsin will not recognize foreign marriages that fail 
to conform to the requirements of§ 245.10.~ 
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The third justification. only obliquely advanced by appel-
lant. is tha.t the statute preserves the ability of marriage 
applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them 
from incurring new obligations. The challenged provisions of 
§ 245.10 a.re so grossly underinclusive with respect to this 
objective. given the many ways that additional financial obli-
gations may be incurred by the applicant quite apart from a 
contemplated marriage. that the classification "does not bear 
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation." 
invalidation of § 245.10 HS unronstitutionHI on its face. In ordinary cir-
cumstHnces, thr Court should merrl~· rrquirr that Wisconsin permit those 
members of the appellre rlH~s to marry if the~· cnn demonstrate " the bona 
fides of ftheir] indigrncy," 401 U. S., at 382. The stHtute in que;;tion, 
howe\•er, dors not rontain H srvernbilit~· rlHuse, Hnd the Wisconsin Lrgis-
lature has made specifir provision for thr contingency that "utilization of 
the procedures f 11ndcr § 245.10 mHy be] stayrd or enjoined by the order 
of Hny court." In the rvent of such H stay or injunction Hfter February 1, 
1978, Chapter 105. Wiscon~in Law~ of 1977. § 245.105 (3) providrs that 
"permission to rrmarry ma~· likrwise be granted to :my petitioner who 
submits clenr and ronvincing proof to the rourt that for rrasonable cause 
he or she wns not Hblr to romply with a prrvious court obligation for child 
support." Suppl. Memorandum of Appellants Hnd Appellers 10. 11. 
The dii;senting opinion of Mn . .TusTICE REHNQUT8'1' sugger,;ts that appellee 
mH~' no longer be " incHpable of discharging thr nrrrarage HS required by 
the support order Hnd contributing sufficient funds in thr future to rrmove 
his child from thr wrlforr rolls." Post, at 4. There is no basis in the 
record for such :spernlntion. The purtie,.: enterrd into a stip11lation that as 
of August 1974. a month brforr appellee was denird a mnrriage licrnse, 
nppeller "wa,.: unrmployed and indigent nnd unablr to pa~· an~· sum for 
~upport of his issue." Apprndix, at 21. In it:; opinion datrd August 31, 
1976. thr District Court notrd tlwt "[i]n Uedhail';.; CHS<', brcause of his 
poverty hr hns bren 11nHblr to ~Htisfy the support obligation ordered in the 
paternity artion, and, hencr, a stntr rourt could not grant him permis;:;ion 
to mnrr~r." Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1070 (ED Wi,:. 1976). 
Appellant hus not challrngrd tl1r factual predicatr of the triHI court's 
<lrtermination, or r\·rn intimatrd that apprllrr',: financial situation haS' 
'improved matrrially . Such matter~, of cour:-;e, mn.y br inquirrd into by 
the local court pursuant to the new l?rocedurrs that will go into effect_ 
;ifter February 1, 1978 .. 
: ,. 
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Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S., at 211 (POWELL, J., concurring). 
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-450 (1972) (plural-
ity opinion of BRENNAN. J.); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleve-
la.nd, Ohio, 431 U, S., at 499-500 (plurality opinion of PowELL, 
J.). 
The marriage applicant not only is required by the Wisconsin 
statute to submit proof of compliance with his support obliga-
tion, but also to demonstrate-in some unspecified way-that 
his children "are not then and are not likely thereafter to 
become public charges."~ This statute does more than simply 
"fail to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic 
circumsta.nces that exist wholly apart from any state action." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 34 (1956) (Harlan, J .. dissent-
ing). It tells the truly indigent. whether they have met their 
support obligations or not. that they ma.y not marry so long as 
their children are public charges or there is a danger that their 
children might go on public assistance in the future.4 Appar-
ently, no other jurisdiction has embraced this approach as a 
method of reducing the number of children on public assist-
ance. Because the State has not established a justification for 
this unprecedented foreclosure of marriage to many of its 
citizens solely because of their indigency, I concur in the 
judgment of the Court. 
3 The pla.intiff in the companion case, Leipzig v. Pallamolla, 418 F. Supp. 
1073 (ED Wis. 1976).1\.lrnd complied with his suppor1 obligations but, was 
denied permission to mnrry bccau~e his four minor children received welfare 
benefits. 
1 Quite n.par1 from nny impnct on the 1ruly indigent, the stntute appears· 
to "confer upon !"the judge] n license for :ubitmry procedure," Kent v. 
United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966), int.he determination whether flJl 
applicnnt's children nre "like!~· thereafter 1o become public chnrges." A 
serious ques1ion of proredurnl due process is raised by this feature of 
standardless discretion,. par.t.icular.ly in light oJ the· lrnzarc6 of prcdictiolll 





.§u:pnm:t (!Jcm-t cf tqt J!foitt~ .§tatts 
~asqinghm. J. (!J. 20'.;i)l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
·near Thurgood: 
January 5, 1978 
Re: 76-879 Zablocki v. Redhail 
I do not see that John's concurring opinion--
which I like and agree with--is in conflict with your 
opinion. Your first full paragraph on page 12 seems 
to me to put you and John on the same wave length. 
If John could see his way clear to join your 
opinion, I would also join him. 
Absent that I now join you. 
/ Regards, 
I 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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